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Polish Road toward an Illiberal State:
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Addison C. Harris Lecture, Indiana University, Maurer School of Law
ADAM BODNAR*
Since 2015, Poland has experienced a backsliding in democratic and rule of law
standards. The ruling party, “Law and Justice,” has adopted a series of legislative
changes affecting the independence of courts and checks and balances mechanisms.
Some reforms were copied from Hungary, which, as the first Member State of
the European Union, started the way toward illiberal democracy in
contemporary Europe. Despite pressure from international organizations, the
process of changes in Poland did not stop. However, it is important to look at
methods implemented to dismantling democracy, as they can be used in other
countries. This paper also analyzes different forms of domestic and
international resistance toward non-democratic changes, including the special
role of civil society and lawyers, as well as monitoring and judicial mechanisms
used by the European Union.
Keywords: Poland, Illiberal Democracy, Human Rights, Rule of Law,
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INTRODUCTION
On November 15, 1989, Lech Wałęsa, leader of the Solidarity trade union in
Poland, who later became the Poland’s President, delivered a speech to the US
Congress. It was a symbolic moment for Poland, which had recently begun the
democratic process after regaining full independence, following the partially free
parliamentary elections held on June 4, 1989. In his speech, Lech Wałęsa thanked
both the U.S. government and the American people for supporting democracy’s
cause in Poland. He started his speech with the words “We the People.”1
With this speech, Poland started on its path toward becoming a constitutional
democracy and member state of the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU). Shortly after, Poland became
a market economy that experienced continuous growth and is commonly regarded as
an economic success story, apart from macroeconomic destabilization and

1. “‘We the People.’ With these words I wish to begin my address. I do not need to
remind anyone here where these words come from. And I do not need to explain that I – an
electrician from Gdansk – am also entitled to invoke them.” President Lech Wałęsa, Address
to a Joint Session of the United States Congress (Nov. 15, 1989) (transcript available at
http://10-25.pl/we-the-people/ [https://perma.cc/LQV8-CM7T]).

2021]

POLISH ROAD TOWARD ILLIBERAL STATE

1061

hyperinflation that occurred just after 1989.2 But let us take another snapshot. Just
thirty years after President Lech Wałęsa’s speech, Poland was subjected to the EU’s
rule of law mechanism, a procedure implemented to address threats to rule of law in
EU Member States.3 Currently, Poland is the only EU member state subject to this
special monitoring procedure by the Council of Europe’s Monitoring Committee.4 In
order to defend their constitutionally dictated independence, Polish judges organized
the One Thousand Gowns demonstration, with the support of judges from twenty
other EU member states.5 The demonstration, which took place in January of 2020,
was a protest against proposed changes to the Polish judicial system. It has also
become a symbol of strong solidarity among EU Member States’ judges, as
representatives of more than twenty Member States participated in this
demonstration. Finally, that same month, U.S. Congressmen Eliot Engel and Bill
Keating, who sit on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, wrote a joint letter to
Polish President Andrzej Duda, in which they called on Polish authorities not to
adopt a so-called “muzzle law,” aimed at silencing judges. In their letter,
Representatives Engel and Keating claimed that “[e]nacting this law would represent
a significant step backward for Poland’s historically strong leadership in democratic
reforms in Europe. The erosion of democratic principles would undermine the great
strides Poland has made through the decades to build a modern, democratic
country.”6
These snapshots raise a few questions: How did this constitutional crisis happen?
Why was such a dramatic change possible? What went wrong? Are these events part
of a general trend or specific to Poland?
These questions can be answered by presenting the story of the dismantling of the
rule of law in Poland. This story is far from being over, as the dismantling process is
not completed. Some of the methods and strategies implemented by ruling party may
be regarded as almost a playbook for other autocratic regimes.7 However, due to
resistance from civil society, judges’ and prosecutors’ organizations, political
opposition, and international organizations from numerous stakeholders, the
situation in Poland may still improve, and the country may come back to a democratic
track.

2. Stanisław Gomułka, Poland's Economic and Social Transformation 1989–2014 and
Contemporary Challenges, 16 CENT. BANK REV. 1, 19 (2016).
3. Commission Recommendation 2018/103 of 20 December 2017 Regarding the Rule
of Law in Poland Complementary to Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and
(EU) 2017/1520, C/2017/9050, 2018 O.J. (L 17) 50, 50–64.
4. Eur. Parl. Ass., The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Poland, 1st Sess., Res.
No. 2316 (2020), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid
=28504&lang=en [https://perma.cc/B63F-38BC].
5. Christian Davies, Judges Join Silent Rally to Defend Polish Justice, THE GUARDIAN,
(Jan. 12, 2020, 2:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/12/poland-marchjudges-europe-protest-lawyers [https://perma.cc/3QUF-GTV5].
6. Letter from Eliot E. Engel & Bill Keating, Reps., U.S. House of Reps., to Andrzej
Dude, President of the Republic of Pol. (Jan. 17, 2020), https://foreignaffairs.house.gov
/2020/1/engel-and-keating-urge-polish-president-to-reject-dangerous-judicial-reforms [https:
//perma.cc/CN9W-TN83].
7. WOJCIECH SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN, 269–70 (2019).
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I. TRAJECTORY OF CHANGES IN POLAND
A. Political Background of Changes
In order to understand the situation in Poland, one must examine the trajectory of
legal and political changes in the country. It is important to note that these changes
did not happen overnight. Rather, they resulted from a long process of political and
legal actions aimed at dismantling constitutional guarantees and safeguards.
Poland’s current ruling party, “Law and Justice,” came to power as a result of
parliamentary elections in October 2015. Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the party,
had proclaimed in 2011 that he wanted to build “Budapest in Warsaw.”8 He praised
the reforms made in Hungary by its strongman, Viktor Orbán. Orbán has managed
to transition the country from a constitutional democracy to an illiberal state by using
parliamentary majority, changing the operation of different independent institutions,
and having so-called “constructive dialogue” with international institutions
(especially the EU).9 At the same time, he secured relative economic stability for
Hungarian people and was highly efficient in using different propaganda techniques,
including promotion of a nationalistic agenda.10
B. Subordination of the Constitutional Court
The process of change in Poland started with an attack on the independence of the
Constitutional Court by the “Law and Justice” party after its failure to win the
constitutional majority. The attack consisted of a few legislative changes aimed at
changing the operation of the Constitutional Court and packing the Constitutional
Court with three newly appointed judges, although seats for those judicial positions
had been filled by the previous Parliament. The court-packing scheme began when
President Andrzej Duda decided not to swear in judges that had been appointed by
the 2011–2015 Parliament. Soon after, the new Parliament, controlled by the Law
and Justice party, annulled the judicial nominations that had been made by the

8. “Przyjdzie dzień że w Warszawie będzie Budpeszt” [“The day will come when there
will be Budapest in Warsaw”], TVN24 (Oct. 9, 2011, 8:57 PM) (Pol.), https://tvn24.pl
/polska/przyjdzie-dzien-ze-w-warszawie-bedzie-budapeszt-ra186922-3535336 [https://perma
.cc/LVN7-BBTF].
9. Kim Lane Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution,
in CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AREA: THEORY, LAW AND
POLITICS IN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA 111, 124–37 (Armin von Bogdandy & Pál Sonnevend,
eds., 2015).
10. For more discussion on the building of an illiberal state both in Poland and in
Hungary, see Timea Drinóczi & Agnieszka, Bień-Kacała, Illiberal Constitutionalism: The
Case of Hungary and Poland, 20 GERMAN L.J., (2019), 1140, 1142–48. See also Anne
Applebaum, Illiberal Democracy Comes to Poland, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2016/12/22/illiberal-democracycomes-to-poland/ [https://perma.cc/E8QA-H6GS]; Jacques Rupnik, Illiberal Democracy in
East-Central Europe, 6 ESPRIT 69–85 (June 2017), https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E
_ESPRI_1706_0069--illiberal-democracy-in-east-central-euro.htm [https://perma.cc/JP3KX42L]. For an interesting portrayal of changes in Poland and in Hungary as examples of
national populism, see ROGER EATWELL & MATTHEW GOODWIN, NATIONAL POPULISM: THE
REVOLT AGAINST LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018).
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previous Parliament. The Parliament then elected different judges, who were
immediately sworn in by the President in the middle of the night. Over the next
several months, a few more judicial positions became vacant and were filled in with
new judges selected by the Law and Justice party. As a result, by the end of 2016,
the Law and Justice party had installed a majority of loyal judges in the
Constitutional Court and secured the election of a chief justice loyal to the party’s
cause.11
Since January 2017, the Constitutional Court is no longer an independent
constitutional body exercising judicial review. Chief Justice Julia Przyłębska, who
was appointed in December 2016 and is strongly connected with the ruling party
(Julia Przyłębska’s husband is the Ambassador of Poland in Germany), started to
have influence over the Constitutional Court’s daily operation, including over its
docket. Moreover, in cases of political significance, the composition of judicial
panels has been manipulated so as to exclude any dissenting voices. The
Constitutional Court operates, but its independence and effectiveness are mostly a
façade. Moreover, sometimes the court’s power is used as a mechanism to legitimize
legislative acts made by the Law and Justice party.12
The political subordination of the Constitutional Court soon became the subject
of close observation by numerous international bodies. The Venice Commission, an
advisory body of the Council of Europe (but also with membership of the United
States) focused on constitutional law, issued significant opinions on the matter.13 The
European Union started its first monitoring actions, by implementing its so-called
“Rule of Law” procedure provided in Article 7 TEU. This issue was also raised by
President Barack Obama during the NATO summit that took place in Warsaw in the
summer of 2016.14 Nevertheless, the international criticism and domestic protest
(including massive demonstrations organized by the Committee to Protect
Democracy) did not stop the Law and Justice party from moving forward with its
authoritarian agenda. It was clear to Mr. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the party’s leader, that
the Constitutional Court’s power to exercise judicial review was crucial to change
the system of government in Poland, without actually changing the text of the Polish
Constitution.

11. The process of changes in the composition and in the legislative basis for operation
of the Constitutional Court has been subjected to review by the Venice Commission. See
Venice Comm’n, Opinion on Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional
Tribunal of Poland, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms
/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2016)001-e [https://perma.cc/RW8B-L3YG]; Venice Comm’n,
Poland: Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)026-e
[https://perma.cc/6HR9-57FR].
12. Wojciech Sadurski, Polish Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS: From an Activist
Court, to a Paralysed Tribunal, to a Governmental Enabler, 11 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE L. 63,
77 (2019).
13. See supra note 11.
14. Remarks by President Obama and President Duda After Bilateral Meeting, U.S.
MISSION TO THE NATO (July 8, 2016), https://nato.usmission.gov/remarks-president-obamapresident-duda-poland-bilateral-meeting/ (“That’s what make us democracies — not just by
the words written in constitutions, or in the fact that we vote in elections — but the institutions
we depend upon every day, such as rule of law, independent judiciaries, and a free press.”).
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C. Changes in the Operation of Other Independent State Bodies
In 2016, while public attention was focused on the fate of the Constitutional
Court, the Polish Parliament passed a few legislative acts that increased the powers
of the state apparatus.
First, the Office of the Public Prosecutor General was merged with the Office of
the Minister of Justice.15 This merged system had existed in Poland from 1989 until
2010, when the Prosecutor General was made independent of the executive power.
However, this independence ended with the 2016 “reform” of the Prosecutor’s
Office, aimed at creating a hierarchical subordination of all prosecutors in the
country. Moreover, the Prosecutor General gained the individual right to decide on
almost any investigation in the country after being given the power to change or
revoke the decisions of subordinate public prosecutors. Furthermore, since 2016, a
number of integral and professional prosecutors have been removed from their
positions or demoted.16 Some of them established the Association of Prosecutors
“Lex Super Omnia,” which actively monitors policies and practices of the
Prosecutors’ Office.
Second, two legislative acts increased the powers of governmental intelligence
forces in terms of surveillance and anti-terrorist policies. As a result, these groups
have a very broad surveillance mandate, and they work with almost no democratic
oversight.17
Third, the non-partisan character of the civil service was abolished. This change
was a strategic decision dating back to 1989, when the independent character of the
civil service was established.18 But this independent model was in fact abolished with
a simple legislative act, allowing for purely political nominations to a number of
higher positions in the civil service.19
The above changes were all accomplished with legislative acts. Moreover, all of
them were challenged before the Constitutional Court for lack of compliance with
the Constitution. However, the Constitutional Court was so overwhelmed with the
fight for its own independence that it did not manage to make a review of these laws.

15. Venice Comm’n, Poland: Opinion on the Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office as
Amended, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms
/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)028-e [https://perma.cc/9FNZ-54K7].
16. Prokuratura pod specjalnym nadzorem. Kadry i postępowanie „dobrej zmiany” [The
Prosecutor’s Office Under Special Supervision. Staff and way of operation of “good
change”], FORUM OBYWATELSKIEGO ROZWOJU [FORUM FOR CIVIC DEVELOPMENT] (Nov. 26,
2018),
https://for.org.pl/pl/a/6413,raport-prokuratura-pod-specjalnym-nadzorem-kadry-ipostepowanie-dobrej-zmiany [https://perma.cc/HD3X-6J7C].
17. Venice Comm’n, Poland: Opinion on the Act of 15 January 2016 Amending the
Police Act and Certain Other Acts, COUNCIL OF EUR. (June 13 2016), https://www.venice
.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)012-e [https://perma.cc
/AD99-73XM].
18. JACEK KOZŁOWSKI & ROBERT SOBIECH, SŁUŻBA CYWILNA DZIŚ I JUTRO. KLUCZOWE
PROBLEMY I PROPOZYCJE ROZWIĄZAŃ [CIVIL SERVICE TODAY AND TOMORROW: KEY PROBLEMS
AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS] (2020) (Pol.), https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2020
/09/Sluzba-cywilna-dzis-i-jutro.pdf [https://perma.cc/96MR-R6GS].
19. Ustawa z dnia 30 grudnia 2015 r. o zmianie ustawy o służbie cywilnej oraz niektórych
innych ustaw [The Act of 30 December 2015 Amending the Civil Service Act and Certain
Other Acts], 2016 r. Dz. U. poz. 34 (Pol.).
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After 2017, the Constitutional Court—under new politically loyal leadership—was
not interested in examining the actions of the legislature. Some of the petitions have
been withdrawn from the Constitutional Court (e.g., by the Ombudsman).
But there was one more change that happened at that time. The Polish Parliament
adopted a new law on public broadcasting. This law enabled the ruling party to
appoint its own loyal manager and officers to steer public radio and television. In
Poland this is a strong instrument of power, since public radio and television reach
the entire country, including rural areas (where there is no cable television with
access to independent TV channels). As a result, public radio and television became
a source of governmental propaganda and disinformation, with huge public funding.
A number of independent, just, and integral journalists have been fired.20 Public
television is using manipulative information techniques, targeting critics with
defamation lawsuits,21 and organizing hate campaigns against selected politicians,
activists, professional groups (e.g., judges), and thinkers. These changes have had a
tremendous impact on the outcomes of elections.22
The Public Broadcasting Law was subject to review by the Constitutional Court
in its old composition. The Constitutional Court made a judgment in a panel
composed of three judges nominated before “Law and Justice” took the power. In its
judgment of December 13, 2016, the Constitutional Court found provisions on the
appointment of top-level public media officers to be unconstitutional. 23 However,
this judgment has been just ignored by the government. It has never been
implemented. Because the prosecutor’s office is subject to political control by the
ruling majority, there is a limited chance of any criminal responsibility for
disobeying constitutional obligations or abusing the law. Therefore, since 2017, it
has become more common for governmental negligence in the adoption of different
laws simply to go unpunished.
D. Attack on Independence of the Judiciary
In 2017, the Law and Justice party began to dismantle judicial independence in
Poland. The process of making changes in the judiciary was complicated. As Steven

20. For a list of journalists who were subject to reprisals by the Law and Justice party, see
“Dobra zmiana” w mediach [The “Good Change” in the Media], TOWARZYSTWO
DZIENNIKARSKIE [SOCIETY OF JOURNALISTS] (Pol.), http://towarzystwodziennikarskie.pl/dobra
-zmiana-w-mediach/ [https://perma.cc/B2ZB-AD9K].
21. The major opponent of the ruling party among intellectuals is Wojciech Sadurski. See
Gráinne de Búrca, John Morijn, & Maximilian Steinbeis, Stand with Wojciech Sadurski: His
Freedom of Expression is (Y)ours, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (NOV. 18, 2019),
https://verfassungsblog.de/stand-with-wojciech-sadurski-his-freedom-of-expression-isyours/ [https://perma.cc/V8LG-Z7JU].
22. See OFF. FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. & HUM. RTS. [ODIHR], ORG. FOR SEC. & COOP. IN
EUR. [OSCE], REPUBLIC OF POLAND: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 28 JUNE AND 12 JULY 2020,
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/2/464601.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9DY-75NF].
23. Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal 13 December 2016 (No. K 13/16) (Pol.). See
Press Release, Trybunał Konstytucyjny, Press Release After the Hearing: The Act Amending
the Broadcasting Act (Dec. 13, 2016), https://trybunal.gov.pl/en/news/press-releases/after-the
-hearing/art/9516-ustawa-o-zmianie-ustawy-o-radiofonii-i-telewizji [https://perma.cc/GYG98URS].
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Levitsky and David Ziblatt argue, the process of eliminating referees, the enemies of
any autocrat, does not take place overnight.24 In Poland’s case, this process was
accomplished through a series of laws. But before going into details, one should
understand how it was at all possible. There were the following reasons behind it:
– The Constitutional Court could not effectively exercise judicial review, because
it had become a politically subordinated institution effectively controlled by the
ruling party.
– There was a real need to reform Polish courts, due to their lack of efficiency and
some problems with judicial accountability. As a result, it was much easier for the
government to argue that the judiciary needed reform. At the same time, the public
had a limited capability to understand the real objective of the reforms, i.e. the
political subordination of the judiciary.
– The general understanding of the rule of law and the importance of judicial
institutions to the lives of regular citizens is quite low in Poland. Reforms aiming to
create a rule of law started in 1989.25 Apparently, the period of twenty-five years that
followed was not long enough to embed the importance of judicial independence into
people’s legal awareness. Therefore, it was relatively easy for the government to
attack courts and judges.

Between 2017 and 2020, the Parliament, controlled by the Law and Justice party,
and supported by a loyal President of the Republic, managed to adopt several laws
aimed at restricting judicial independence. It would exceed the limits of this article
to present the whole legislative history and content of those laws in detail.
Nevertheless, it is important to examine the most important changes introduced by
those laws.
1. Court Presidents
The legislation adopted in 2017 amending the organization of Poland’s common
courts opened the window of opportunity for the Minister of Justice, Zbigniew
Ziobro, to dismiss and replace all presidents of common courts without consulting
the judges sitting in those courts. Thanks to this change in legislation, the Minister
of Justice has violated the traditional rule of consulting judges before nominating
their superiors, shortened the terms of previous court presidents, and filled those
newly vacant positions with people loyal to the Law and Justice party. In the Polish
legal system, court presidents have a lot of administrative powers with respect to
judges. The personal opinions of court presidents may also influence the future
careers of judges in a given court.26

24. STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 78–80 (2018).
25. One of the best books on this period is MARK BRZEZINSKI, THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND (1998).
26. Two former vice-presidents of the Kielce Regional Court have submitted complaints
to the European Court of Human Rights after being prematurely dismissed from their posts by
the Ministry of Justice as a result of this new legislation. On June 29, 2021, the European
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2. National Council of the Judiciary
Pursuant to the Polish Constitution, the major organ responsible for judicial
nominations in Poland is the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) (Krajowa Rada
Sądownictwa, KRS). The NCJ comprises twenty-five representatives of different
branches of power, fifteen of whom are judges. According to the traditional
interpretation of the Polish Constitution, the judicial members should be elected by
their peers. But the Constitution does not mandate it with precise clarity. As a result
of this ambiguity, the Parliament led by the Law and Justice party changed the
method of appointing judicial members and shortened the terms of previous NCJ
members.27 Under this new legislation, judicial members of the NCJ are elected with
by a three-fifths majority in Sejm (the lower chamber of the Parliament). Thus, the
process of nominating new judges to the NCJ has been politically secured by the
ruling party, and only loyal judges are now elected to this constitutional body. Not
long after these changes were implemented, the NCJ in its new composition
participated in a process of judicial nominations to the newly created two chambers
of the Supreme Court (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs and the
Disciplinary Chamber).28 The status of the NCJ is the subject of questioning at the
EU level.29 Moreover, the NCJ’s status as a member of the European Network of
Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) has been suspended.30
3. The Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Mechanism
Under Polish law, the Supreme Court is the top judicial organ reviewing
extraordinary appeals against final judgments in civil, labor, and criminal matters. It
also adjudicates cases concerning electoral or regulatory issues. In 2017, the Law
and Justice party tried to undermine the independence of the Supreme Court. The

Court of Human Rights decided that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
has been violated in their case, as they could not challenge the decision on premature dismissal
to any court. The ECtHR has awarded 20.000 EUR compensation for pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages to each of them; Broda and Bojara v. Poland, Applications no. 26691/18
and 27367/18, Chamber Judgment of June 29, 2021.
27. Two former members of the NCJ have also submitted their cases to the European
Court of Human Rights concerning the termination of their membership in the NCJ: Grzęda
v. Poland, App. No. 43572/18 (July 9, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194853
[https://perma.cc/G7CL-7DYX]; Żurek v. Poland, App. No. 39650/18 (May 20, 2020),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-202650 [https://perma.cc/5VQ2-QGLR].
28. See infra Section I.D.3.
29. See, e.g., European Commission, 2020 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the
Rule of Law Situation in Poland 3–4 (Staff Working Document No. SWD (2020) 320 final,
Sept. 30, 2020) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/pl_rol_country_chapter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8S6X-44YE].
30. The decision to suspend the NCJ’s membership in the ENCJ was made by the ENCJ
General Assembly on September 17, 2018. ENCJ Suspends Polish National Judicial Council
– KRS, Eur. Network of Councils for the Judiciary, https://www.encj.eu/node/495
[https://perma.cc/7HLS-WYKH]. Currently, the ENCJ is contemplating expulsion of the NCJ.
See Position Paper of the Board of the ENCJ on the Membership of the KRS (Expulsion), at
9–10 (May 27, 2020), https://www.encj.eu/index.php/node/556 [https://perma.cc/E36LBFR6].
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Parliament passed new law that changed the organization of the Supreme Court. It
provided that all judges of the Supreme Court would be retired, except those selected
by the Minister of Justice. However, this law—due to its radical nature and massive
people’s protests31—was vetoed by the President of Poland. Nevertheless, under a
couple of new legislative acts (that were later on revised a few times in order to
achieve an intended political objective) a lot of other changes have been introduced.
Most importantly:
– The retirement age for judges of the Supreme Court was decreased from seventy
to sixty-five. As a result of this change, which was applied to the judges sitting on
the Supreme Court at the time, twenty judges were forced into retirement. This
provision applied also to the First President of the Supreme Court, whose
constitutional six-year term was shortened by this provision. However, due to
intervention by the Court of Justice of the European Union,32 judges pushed into
retirement were able to come back to adjudication.33
– A new disciplinary system for judges has been created.34 New legislation pushed

by the ruling party has created a new framework for disciplinary procedures against
judges.35 At the center of this framework are: top disciplinary judges, who are
empowered to bring disciplinary cases against judges, appointed by the Minister of
Justice, and the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, fully appointed in 2015
by the NCJ in a new composition. This new disciplinary system creates many
possibilities to exert influence on judges’ behavior, and it is being used to target
members of judicial associations and judges who have protested against the ruling
party’s threats to judicial independence.36 Moreover, the so-called “muzzle law”
adopted in 2020 created additional possibilities for the Law and Justice party, acting

31. Rick Lyman, In Poland, an Assault on the Courts Provokes Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (July
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/world/europe/poland-courts-law-and-justice
-party.html [https://perma.cc/2HEC-W6NB].
32. Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No. 159/18, Order of the VicePresident of the EU Court of Justice in Case C-619/18 R, Commission v Poland: Poland Must
Immediately Suspend the Application of the Provisions of National Legislation Relating to the
Lowering of the Retirement Age for Supreme Court Judges (Oct. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Order
of the Vice-President of the EU Court of Justice in Case C-619/18].
33. Case C-619/18, Comm’n v Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 ¶¶ 95–97 (June 24, 2019).
34. Katarzyna Gajda-Roszczynialska & Krystian Markiewicz, Disciplinary Proceedings
as an Instrument for Breaking the Rule of Law in Poland, 12 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 451, 456–
57 (2020).
35. A remarkable report concerning the system of disciplinary proceedings against Polish
judges, including its practical application, was prepared in 2019 by the Batory Foundation.
BATORY FOUND. & THE EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE, THE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM FOR
JUDGES IN POLAND: THE CASE FOR INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS ¶¶ 17–33 (2019),
https://esiweb.org/publications/disciplinary-system-judges-poland-case-infringementproceedings [https://perma.cc/UYW9-HG4E].
36. See MICHAŁ BOBER, PIOTR GĄCIAREK, JOANNA JURKIEWICZ, JAKUB KOŚCIERZYŃSKI,
MARIUSZ KRASOŃ, & DOROTA ZABŁUDOWSKA, JUSTICE UNDER PRESSURE – REPRESSIONS AS A
MEANS OF ATTEMPTING TO TAKE CONTROL OVER THE JUDICIARY AND PROSECUTION IN
POLAND. YEARS 2015–2019 (Jakub Kościerzyński ed., 2020), https://www.iustitia.pl/images
/pliki/raport2020/Raport_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5NR-JPYB].
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through the Disciplinary Representatives selected by the Minister of Justice (and thus
implementing governmental objectives), to target disobeying judges.37
– The Law and Justice party created two new chambers of the Supreme Court: the
Disciplinary Chamber, and the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs.
The party then packed those chambers with judges selected by the NCJ in its new
composition. The Disciplinary Chamber has a significant level of independence from
the general structure of the Supreme Court. It has autonomous status within the
Supreme Court and ultimate power to adjudicate on disciplinary cases against all
judges, remuneration scheme for its judges (earning 40% more than other Supreme
Court judges).
– The Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court has started to adjudicate
disciplinary cases against Polish judges, mostly those who were active in their fight
for judicial independence. It has been the subject of numerous legal challenges
brought by way of preliminary references (questions asked by Polish courts to the
CJEU) or infringement actions by the European Commission.38 Despite this the
Disciplinary Chamber continued to operate. On February 4, 2020, it decided to
suspend judge Paweł Juszczyszyn as a result of disciplinary proceedings. He was
accused of committing a disciplinary delict, because he wanted to verify status of
judicial nominations made by the National Council of Judiciary in its new
composition.39
– On April 8, 2020, the EU Court of Justice issued an interim order, which forced
the Disciplinary Chamber to suspend the adjudication of disciplinary cases
concerning judges.40 However, the interim order did not specifically address
proceedings other than disciplinary ones. Therefore, some judges started to be
targeted with proceedings aimed at lifting their judiciary immunity. Relevant cases
have been brought by the Prosecutor’s Office. As a result, two additional judges have
been suspended: Beata Morawiec, and Igor Tuleya.41 Interestingly, Beata Morawiec

37. See ODIHR, OSCE, Urgent Interim Opinion on the Bill Amending the Act on the
Organization of Common Courts, the Act on the Supreme Court and Certain Other Acts of
Poland (As of 20 December 2019), at ¶¶ 78–86, Opinion-Nr.: JUD-POL/365/2019 [AIC] (Jan.
14, 2020), https://www.osce.org/odihr/443731 [https://perma.cc/26NK-HY6T]; Venice
Comm’n & Directorate Gen. of Hum. Rts. & Rule of L., Poland: Urgent Joint Opinion on the
Amendments to the Law on Organisation on the Common Courts, the Law on the Supreme
Court and Some Other Laws, CDL-PI(2020)002, COUNCIL OF EUR. 8–9 (Jan. 16, 2020),
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdf=CDL-PI(2020)002e&lang=fr [https://perma.cc/37HJ-GBT6].
38. See opinion of the Advocate General E. Tanchev of May 6, 2021 in Case C‑791/19,
Comm’n v. Poland. The CJEU judgment in this case was delivered on July 15, 2021, and
declared that the whole system of disciplinary responsibility of Polish judges is contrary to
Article 19 TEU and violates principles of judicial independence. ECLI:EU:C:2021:596.
39. See Polish Judge Suspended in Row Over Court Shake-Up, BBC (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51370907 [https://perma.cc/MQ8Z-LZ4E].
40. Case C-791/19, Comm’n v Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2020:277 (Apr. 8, 2020).
41. See CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., AM. BAR ASS’N, THE CASE OF JUDGE IGOR TULEYA:
CONTINUED THREATS TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN POLAND 10–11 (2020), https://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/human_rights/justice-defenders/igor-tuleya
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managed to win her case on June 7, 2021, and she was reinstated. The case of Igor
Tuleya, however, became much more symbolic. After his suspension, the
prosecutor’s office wanted to present criminal charges against him. As a civil
disobedience measure, he refused any cooperation with the Prosecutor’s Office.
Prosecutors requested that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court use
physical coercion measures against Tuleya. However, the Disciplinary Chamber
ultimately refused to do it.42 It is not clear what the Court’s motivation was–
compliance with the Constitution, or perhaps some kind of political calculation
connected with the poor optics of a judge being arrested. Nevertheless, Tuleya is still
suspended as a judge and deprived of his judicial immunity. There are also other
judges facing proceedings aiming to suspend them, most notably Włodzimierz
Wróbel, one of the most prominent criminal lawyers in Poland and a judge on the
Supreme Court.
– The circumstances surrounding the appointment of judges in 2018 to the
Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs and the Disciplinary Chamber
of the Supreme Court were also dubious. In response, the EU Court of Justice has
created a test allowing judges of other courts to verify whether the NCJ’s
appointments fulfilled the EU’s guarantees of judicial independence.43 However, it
seems that due to different disciplinary measures and other methods of harassment
against judges (see above, in particular the case of Paweł Juszczyszyn), it has been
difficult for other courts to open such processes of verification.
– On April 30, 2020, the constitutional six-year term of the First President of the
Supreme Court, Małgorzata Gersforf, came to an end. The new First President,
Małgorzata Manowska, was selected in a controversial way, as most of the support
for Manowska came from newly appointed judges. It is already clear that the new
First President of the Supreme Court will not implement the policies of her
predecessor. Moreover, her statements and actions upon taking office suggest that
she will try to undermine neither the mandates of any judges to adjudicate as a result
of CJEU orders or judgments, nor the status of the NCJ in its new composition. For
example, Ms. Manowska did not challenge immunity-waiving proceedings pending
against judges, despite the obvious threat to judicial independence. Manowska’s
appointment does not mean, however, that the Supreme Court lost its independence.
There are currently more than fifty judges sitting on the Supreme Court who can still
be regarded as guardians of judicial integrity. Moreover, there is a chance that
pressure from the EU may lead to some structural changes in the Supreme Court,
including possible liquidation of the Disciplinary Chamber.

.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LW3-7FHX].
42. Vanessa Gera, Polish Legal Body Rejects Prosecutor Request to Arrest Judge, ASSOC.
PRESS (Apr. 23, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/europe-government-and-politicsa783b94d031f2680f6651da0280764e3 [https://perma.cc/SW79-P6C4].
43. Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18, A.K. v. Ktajowa Rada Sadownictwa
[NCJ] & CP & DO v. Sad Najwyższy [Supreme Court of Poland], ECLI:EU:C:2019:982 (Nov.
19, 2019); see also Joelle Grogan, Introductory Note to Joined Cases A. K. v. Krajowa Rada
Sądownictwa (C-585/18) and CP (C-624/18), DO (C-625/18) v. Sąd Najwyższy (C.J.E.U.), 59
INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 459 (2020).
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4. Judicial Independence: The Way Forward?
The process of reducing judicial independence in Poland is not yet over. Some
institutions lost their independent and non-partisan status: The NCJ, court presidents,
and disciplinary judges. The Supreme Court remains somewhat independent, not
institutionally, but rather due to the strength and integrity of some its judges.
Additionally, the Supreme Administrative Court and Regional Administrative Courts
have maintained their independent statuses, but their role might be limited in the
future, due to packing-in of those courts with new judges selected by the NCJ. There
are numerous judges who are subject to disciplinary proceedings due to their
involvement in protests concerning judicial reforms, but also due to the merits of
their judgments (especially those that go against the ruling party). Disciplinary cases
often have a so-called “chilling effect” on judges.
Nevertheless, pressure by the European Union, as well as popular support,44 give
a lot of courage to Polish judges. Therefore, despite the institutional changes
implemented by the ruling party, Polish citizens may still, in most cases, count on
enjoying judicial independence in adjudicating their cases. However, there is a
paradox in this reality, as it seems that the pressure exerted on Polish judges to act in
accordance with political expectations instead serves as motivation for many judges
to act against the ruling party to protect their independence and remain loyal to the
Polish constitution.
II. REASONS AND METHODS EMPLOYED TO IMPLEMENT CHANGE – SIMILARITIES TO
OTHER SYSTEMS
A. Taking Advantage of Economic Stability and Tradition
Certainly, when implementing reforms, the Law and Justice party took advantage
of the social stability and economic growth in Poland. As of 2019, 81% of Polish
citizens claim that they enjoy middle or good quality of life. It is a remarkable
achievement.45 The previous government, controlled by the “Civic Platform,” which
ruled Poland between 2007 and 2015, concentrated mostly on infrastructure
development and economic growth. However, its policies increased disparities
between bigger cities and smaller cities/rural areas. It was the initiative of the Law
and Justice party to invest more money into massive social programs to support
families with children, most notably the program entitled “Family 500 Plus.”46 The
party has also revoked the prior reform of the retirement system, which provided for

44. See infra III.B and III.C.
45. Anna Cieślak-Wróblewska & Grzegorz Siemionczyk, Polska jest dziś pięć razy
bogatsza niż w 1989 r. [Poland is Five Times Richer Today than It Aas in 1989],
RZECZPOSPOLITA [REPUBLIC] (June 4, 2019, 12:35PM) (Pol.), https://www.rp.pl/Biznes
/306039901-Polska-jest-dzis-piec-razy-bogatsza-niz-w-1989-r.html [https://perma.cc/NA7KYYD5].
46. The Family 500 Plus program provides families with a monthly allowance of 500
Polish zloty (approximately 120 USD) per child in a family. It is especially significant for
families living in smaller cities and rural areas. Ministry of Fam. & Soc. Pol’y, “Family 500+”
Programme, Republic of Pol. (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.gov.pl/web/family/family-500programme [https://perma.cc/PPA5-WKQE].
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a higher retirement age. Finally, it started to fight against abusive labor practices. As
a result, the Law and Justice party was acclaimed for building a more egalitarian
society.
The Law and Justice party has incorporated those social factors and reforms into
a political discourse along with a populist narrative about national pride, martyrdom
of Polish heroes during the Second World War, and a vision of Poland as being the
opponent of alleged threats coming from other parts of the world (such as fear of
massive migration).47 Polish society is quite homogenous. Therefore, the ruling party
chose the somewhat easy task of presenting itself as the defender of traditional
values, family, and Christianity in Poland. All of these factors created fertile ground
for “reforms” affecting many state institutions. Because these “reforms” did not have
an impact on the day-to-day lives of most citizens, the public at large seemed to be
unconcerned. However, recently, the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court on
October 22, 2020, concerning access to legal abortion, provoked massive protests
across the country.48
B. Civic Awareness Level
In Poland there is a relatively low level of civic awareness concerning the
operation of the country’s independent institutions, including, among other things,
how they are constructed, their role in the democracy, and the division of powers
among them. Poland’s transition to a democracy began just thirty-two years ago.
Poland has managed to shift the legal reception of institutions (such as the
Constitutional Court) and basic democratic principles, but legal elites did not spend
enough time educating the public about the objectives of these institutions and why
regular citizens need them.49
Against this background, it was much easier for the Law and Justice party to carry
out massive attacks against the judiciary, not only using smear campaigns, but also

47. For commentary on one of the best outcomes of political strategies by the Law and
Justice party and the use of polarization techniques was presented by Anne Applebaum, A
Warning From Europe: The Worst Is Yet to Come, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2018), https://www
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/poland-polarization/568324/
[https://perma.cc
/X6XG-YW7T].
48. Judgment of the Constitutional Court of October 22, 2020, No. K 1/20, concerning
access to legal abortion, was issued as a result of the ruling party’s parliamentary deputies’
motion, and that resulted in the outbreak of massive protests in Poland. See Anna RakowskaTrela, A Dubious Judgment by a Dubious Court: The Abortion Judgment by the Polish
Constitutional Tribunal, VERFASSUNGSBLOG, (Oct. 24, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/adubious-judgment-by-a-dubious-court/ [https://perma.cc/3L64-6AVC].
49. There is a lot of literature on the transition of post-communist countries to democracy
and the role of institutions in securing those transformations. See, e.g., MARK BRZEZINSKI, THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND (Alex Pravda ed., 1998); Herman Schwartz,
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2000);
RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM (Adam Czarnota, Martin Krygier &
Wojciech Sadurski, eds., 2005); Mark F. Brzezinski, The Emergence of Judicial Review in
Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, 41 AM. J. OF COMPARATIVE L., 153–200 (1993);
WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2d ed. 2014).
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targeting individual judges.50 This strategy, implemented since mid-2017, aimed to
discourage judges from being active in public discourse; it has been noted in a report
by Diego Garcia-Sayan, UN Special Rapporteur on Judicial Independence.51 But
despite reports and statements denouncing these attacks, the Law and Justice party
continued to use them as a political weapon against judges. It should be noted that
negative statements by officials against judges have created an additional risk of
horizontal attacks on these judges by regular citizens. Such risk has been a daily
reality for some prominent judges.52
C. Abuse of Legislative Process
The systemic changes affecting the judicial institutions in Poland would not be
possible without violating the Constitution. The Law and Justice party’s
subordination of the Constitutional Court led to a mockery of the legislative process
and limitation on the role of the Parliament. Such effect was possible due to the Law
and Justice party’s cumulation of political power. Between 2015 and 2019, the party
enjoyed a majority in both the lower (Sejm) and upper (Senate) chambers of the
Parliament. Moreover, most of the time, the party could count on the President to
sign laws with which the party presented him. The speed of proceedings usually did
not allow for proper reflection regarding whether proposed laws were in compliance
with the Constitution. President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court,
Stanisław Zabłocki, has coined the phrase “pendolino speed” to denote the similarity
of the current legislative process to the high-speed train.53 What is more, opinions on
potential unconstitutionality were neglected (even if they were prepared by internal
research offices of the Parliament, especially in the Senate). The Law and Justice
party took advantage of the Constitutional Court’s de facto inability to exercise
judicial review.

50. Magdalena Gałczyńska, Śledztwo Onetu. Farma trolli w Ministerstwie
Sprawiedliwości, czyli „za czynienie dobra nie wsadzamy” [Onett Investigation: A Troll Farm
in the Ministry of Justice, or “We do not Lock [People] Up for Doing Good”], ONET (Aug.
21, 2019, 12:12AM), https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/sledztwo-onetu-farma-trolliw-ministerstwie-sprawiedliwosci-czyli-za-czynienie-dobra/j6hwp7f [https://perma.cc/BKT5TE6F]. In the article, Gałczyńska describes the hate campaign organized against some judges
by close affiliates of the Deputy Minister of Justice Łukasz Piebiak, the chief architect of
judicial changes in Poland. Id.
51. Diego Garcia-Sayan (Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Lawyers and
Judges), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers on his
Mission to Poland, U.N. Doc A/HRC/38/38/Add.1 (Apr. 5, 2018), https://undocs.org/A/HRC
/38/38/Add.1 [https://perma.cc/AE7J-EDST]. Garcia-Sayan made a visit to Poland from
October 23–27, 2017.
52. For the personal story of Judge Igor Tuleya, see Joanna Berendt, In Poland, A
Stubborn Defender of Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www
.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/world/europe/poland-judges-tuleya.html [https://perma.cc/TZJ4KB4L].
53. Stanisław Zabłocki, President of the Criminal Chambers of the Supreme Court,
Speech at the Debate on the Supreme Court Act in the Senate (July 21, 2017) (transcript
available at https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/wystąpienie-wiceprezesa-sądu-najwyższegostanisława-zabłockiego-w-czasie-debaty-o-ustawie-o-sądzie [https://perma.cc/U63V-RVJU])
(Pol.).
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Interestingly, at the same time, the Law and Justice party took good care to assure
that their adopted laws were in formal compliance with procedural rules of legislative
process. Some changes were adopted by reference to formally correct arguments, but
abused for political purposes and contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. A good
example of this abuse of process regards the retirement age of Supreme Court judges.
The Parliament adopted legislation lowering the retirement age from seventy to
sixty-five.54 In promoting this law, the Law and Justice party argued that the rules
should be the same for all Polish judges, whether they sit in common courts or the
Supreme Court. Importantly, however, this change was not made pro futuro. Instead,
it affected the judges sitting on the Supreme Court when the law was passed,
including the First President of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the “equality”
reasoning argument prevailed and was presented to the general public as sufficient
justification for such regulation. Such strategy was also important to the Law and
Justice party for implementing changes affecting judicial independence. The fact that
the arguments supporting these changes look convincing at first sight made it much
more difficult for the public to understand the party’s true motivation in
implementing these changes. Therefore, between 2015 and 2020, Polish lawyers
were forced to consider legal questions from an additional perspective. When looking
at a draft law, lawyers had to think in advance to determine not only what was in the
law, but also what kind of political effect the law aimed to achieve. However, such
analysis implies that legislative proposals are always made in bad faith. Therefore,
lawyers have to go beyond the scope of their traditional roles and add political
imagination to their regular legal review.
D. Strategic Use of Accomplished Facts
Another strategy employed by the Law and Justice party is to use a fait accompli
method. This method allows the party to make changes and resist both domestic and
international pressure, all while achieving progress in dismantling certain
institutions. Use of this strategy has been promoted by Viktor Orbán. This practice
is effective because it gives the impression of a dialogue between national authorities
and international organizations. That is also the perception of the domestic audience.
However, use of any monitoring procedures by international organizations and
response by national authorities requires time. In the meantime, specific changes in
the organization of the state institutions are implemented. After they are completed,
they are almost impossible to be unwrapped. They create irretrievable damage. A
good example is the “muzzle law” adopted in the beginning of 2020. This law aimed
to restrict the ability of Polish judges to verify the status of other judges with regard
to their judicial independence and the manner in which they were appointed. It was
passed in an effort to limit the power that had been conferred upon these judges by
the CJEU judgment in the case A. K. v. Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa and CP & DO

54. Venice Comm’n, Poland: Opinion on the Draft Act Amending the National Council
of the Judiciary, on the Draft Act Amending the Act on the Supreme Court Proposed by the
President of Poland, and on the Act on the Law on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, CDLAD(2017)031, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms
/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)031-e [https://perma.cc/3DW3-K73W].
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v. Sad Najwyższy.55 In fact, after the adoption of the “muzzle law,” any judge who
even attempts to verify the legitimacy of another judge risks disciplinary
proceedings. Such a measure clearly undermines the effectiveness of the EU law
established in A. K. The problem was well known to the European Commission,
considering its vice president, Vera Jourova, visited Poland when the “muzzle law”
was the subject of discussion in the upper chamber of Parliament.56 However, despite
their knowledge of the issue, the European Commission did not bring an official case
to the EU Court of Justice until the end of March 2021.57 This delay has effectively
given Polish authorities time to deepen their attack on judicial independence—in this
case to limit the ability of Polish judges to verify whether the status of other judges
is in compliance with EU law.58
E. Controlling Public Emotions
The Law and Justice party has also tried not to overheat public emotions. Between
2015 and 2019, the use of any physical measures against participants of
demonstrations was heavily restricted. Legal changes implemented by the party were
the subjects of careful propaganda promotions. Disciplinary cases were made
gradually and thoroughly, especially with respect to those judges who had previously
been portrayed as “enemies of state.” Only once, it seems, has the Law and Justice
party gone “one bridge too far.” In July 2017, Parliament passed the law providing
for an early retirement of all judges of the Supreme Court; then the Minister of Justice
could cherry pick those Supreme Court judges whom he believed should stay on the

55. Joined Cases C-585, C-624, & C-625/18, A.K. v. Krajowa Rada Sadownictwa [NCJ]
& CP & DO v. Sad Najwyższy [Supreme Court of Poland], ECLI:EU:C:2019:982 (Nov. 19,
2019).
56. Marek Strzelecki, EU’s Rule-of-Law Chief Defends Polish Judges as Spat Deepens,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2020, 7:39 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0128/eu-s-rule-of-law-chief-defends-polish-judges-as-spat-deepens [https://perma.cc/MF8YDBES]; see also Rob Schmitz, Poland's Overhaul of Its Courts Leads to Confrontation with
European Union, NPR (Feb. 13, 2020, 4:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/13
/805722633/polands-overhaul-of-its-courts-leads-to-confrontation-with-european-union?t
=1581870712307 [https://perma.cc/36BQ-UMAF].
57. Under Article 258 of the EC Treaty, the European Commission may start an
infringement action before the EU Court of Justice if “the Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under the Treaties.” The Commission members thus act as so-called “Guardian of
Treaties.” Before formal submission to the CJEU, the Commission must send to the Member
State concerned a letter of formal notice, and thereafter the reasoned opinion. Those two steps
may take some time, but in urgent cases, it is possible to shorten the timeline to three or four
months.
58. See Adam Bodnar & Paweł Filipek, Time Is of the Essence: The European Approach
Towards the Rule of Law in Poland Should Not Only Focus on Budgetary Discussions,
VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Nov. 30, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/time-is-of-the-essence/
[https://perma.cc/BEZ5-TS7N]. On the delay in the Commission actions see also Laurent
Pech, Patryk Wachowiec & Dariusz Mazur, Poland’s Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year
Assessment of EU’s (In)Action, 13 HAGUE J. OF RULE OF L., 1–43 (2021), https://doi.org/10
.1007/s40803-021-00151-9 [https://perma.cc/5DVY-8CUV].
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Court. This law provoked demonstrations in approximately 250 cities,59 ultimately
compelling President Duda to veto it.60
Since then, the mistake of going too far with just one legislative shot has not been
repeated. As a result, it has been difficult for the general public to understand why
yet another legislative change is dangerous to them. This process has been
nicknamed in Poland the “process of heating the frog”: the frog does not realize when
it has been cooked, until it is too late to save itself. Additionally, legislative changes
were usually analyzed one single piece at a time. Individually, some of them could
seem innocent. But taken together, they have led to a serious imbalance of powers
between executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Therefore, it is the cumulative
effect that counted. With the deepening of the rule of law crisis, one can see the
effects of such cumulative endeavors as different judicial institutions are
subordinated to the wishes of the executive branch.
F. Role of Lawyers
Polish lawyers have played a significant role in defending rule of law. However,
some of them were architects of the changes, justifying the most radical ideas of the
ruling party; drafting legislation; defending it in the Parliament, on social media, and
on television; and using propaganda machinery to promote their vision. But there
were also other lawyers—those who decided to participate in the process of
dismantling the rule of law for the sake of their ideological beliefs, career
opportunities, or other incentives. Without this group of party-loyal or opportunistic
lawyers, the process of implementing the Law and Justice party’s changes would not
be possible. There was a need to fill in vacant positions as new court presidents, as
new judges in the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court, or as lawyers working
in law firms and protecting the political interests of state-owned companies.
Therefore, the Law and Justice party was not alone in its attempts to dismantle the
rule of law. It had constant professional support.
G. Ideology
Certainly, that the ruling party has tied its ideology to defending traditional values
and Christianity played an undeniable role in justifying changes in Poland and attacks
on rule of law. However, it seems that ideology was not a dominant motivation.
Political philosopher Jan-Werner Mueller claims that Viktor Orbán and similar
leaders abuse the concept of Christian democracy. According to these leaders’
ideological vision, Christian democracy is going to protect such states as Hungary or
Poland against Islam and other “morally suspicious” ideologies coming from the

59. Wszystkie protesty na jednej mapie. W obronie sądów spotkaliśmy się w ponad 250
miastach [All protests on one map. In defense of courts we have met in more than 250 cities],
GAZETA WYBORCZA BIQDATA.PL (July 24, 2017), https://biqdata.wyborcza.pl/biqdata
/7,159116,22176137,wszystkie-protesty-na-jednej-mapie-w-obronie-sadow-spotkalismy
.html [https://perma.cc/LY78-P3L8].
60. Rick Lyman, Poland’s President Vetoes Two Proposed Laws Limiting Courts’
Independence, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/world
/europe/poland-president-duda-veto-courts.html [https://perma.cc/6RM4-6MBW].
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West. Mueller says, however, that this ideology is just a cynical ploy with
international actors, aimed to distract them from discussion of real issues happening
in countries marching toward authoritarianism.61
It is important to note that changes in Poland had more than an institutional
dimension: they also resulted in democratic back-sliding. There are strong so-called
“culture wars” under way, affecting mostly women’s rights, refugees, and LGBT
rights.62 The great ally of the ruling party in this war has been the Catholic Church.
However, it seems that from time to time some aspects of the so-called “culture wars”
are politically motivated in order to cover up negligence in the state administration,
or to distract public attention from the European Union rule of law activities or
further attempts to limit judicial independence.
III. RESISTANCE
A. Looking Back to Polish History
In his 1947 work The Treatise on Morality, Polish poet and Nobel Prize winner
Czeslaw Miłosz wrote that “The avalanche changes its course Depending on the
stones it encounters as it forces its way through.”63
Passive people are like flat stones. If they take the Constitution, the rule of law,
and human rights for granted, the avalanche may just slide—flat stones are easy to
overcome. But if people stand up for their rights, each stone might be sturdy,
massive, colossal, or even monumental. A number of people in Poland were like
those sturdy and massive stones. Thanks to the resolve of these citizens, the rule of
law and democracy in 2021 is not as decimated as it could be. Although Poland could
be now portrayed as a system of competitive authoritarianism, there is still hope for
Poland to return to the family of fully democratic countries.64 This hope is rooted in

61. Jan-Werner Mueller, ‘False Advertising’: Christian Democracy or Illiberal
Democracy?, BALKAN INSIGHT: REPORTING DEMOCRACY (Feb. 3, 2020), https://balkaninsight
.com/2020/02/03/false-advertising-christian-democracy-or-illiberal-democracy/
[https:/
/perma.cc/J938-DZ6G] (“Orbán and his ilk are trying to wage an EU-wide culture war because
they have found this to be an effective way to distract domestic and international attention
from the kleptocratic autocracies they have created. By portraying their critics as crazed
progressives pushing for same-sex marriage and ever-more scurrilous forms of identity
politics, they avoid any discussion of their cronyism, politicization of the judiciary, and stifling
control of the media.”).
62. Daniel Baer, Poland’s Slide Toward Homophobic Politics: When Putin’s Rhetoric
Meets Trump’s Populism, FOREIGN AFFS. (July 10, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/poland/2020-07-10/polands-slide-toward-homophobic-politics
[https://perma.cc
/68W9-VPAD].
63. “Lawina bieg od tego zmienia, Po jakich toczy się kamieniach,” A Treatise on
Morality, originally published in “Twórczość” periodical (1948). This famous quotation was
translated by Aleksandra and Michael Parker in ANDRZEJ FRANASZEK, MIŁOSZ. A BIOGRAPHY
(2017), at 240.
64. See Steven Levitsky & Lucan A. Way, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM. HYBRID
REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR (2010); see also Adam Bodnar, System polityczny
Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w świetle teorii konkurencyjnego autorytaryzmu [The Political
System of the Republic of Poland in Light of Competitive Authoritarianism Theory], in WOKÓŁ
KRYZYSU PRAWORZĄDNOŚCI, DEMOKRACJI I PRAW CZŁOWIEKA. KSIĘGA JUBILEUSZOWA MIROSŁAWA
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the fact that even in authoritarian systems there is a possibility of defeating the
incumbent, although doing so requires much stronger energy and creativity on the
part of the opposition.
The process of dismantling the rule of law while simultaneously pretending that
all legal actions are lawful is a long one. One cannot achieve significant results
overnight without using physical force. When implementing a so-called “creeping
coup d’état,” one must progress step by step, adapting different strategies to the
electoral calendar, considering public reaction, discussing with international
partners, analyzing polls, and, when necessary, deciding to soften one’s messages. If
we take a snapshot into 2016 or 2018, we see how Poland has changed and how the
Law and Justice party’s gradual strategy has proven to be effective. Nevertheless,
one may say that the situation could be even worse, were it not for the powerful
resistance of those who oppose unconstitutional changes.
B. Civic Activism
Since 2015, Poland has seen the rebirth of the tradition of non-violent protest
against undemocratic changes. This civic activism took different formats, including:
– Massive public protests organized by the so-called “street opposition”
(especially organizations such as Komitet Obrony Demokracji (the Committee for
the Defense of Democracy), Obywatele RP (Citizens of Poland), and Ogólnopolski
Strajk Kobiet (the All-Poland Women’s Strike), and Akcja Demokracja (Action
Democracy).65
– Different forms of protest arranged by organizations of lawyers, including
networking with international organizations, NGOs, and organizations of judges. A
few examples of such organizations are the Polish Bar Association, the Polish
Council of Legal Advisors, the Association of Polish Judges “Iustitita,” the
Association of Judges “Themis,” the Association of Prosecutors “Lex Super Omnia,”
the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, and the Forum for Civic Development.
The most prominent example is an umbrella organization, “The Committee to Protect
Justice,” which promotes the value of respect for the rule of law, and also supports
judges and prosecutors who are subject to pressure and intimidation.66

WYRZYKOWSKIEGO [AROUND THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS] 119,
(Adam Bodnar & Adam Ploszka eds., 2020), https://www.academia.edu/44842170/System
_polityczny_Rzeczpospolitej_Polskiej_w_%C5%9Bwietle_teorii_konkurencyjnego_autoryta
ryzmu [https://perma.cc/86JC-LRJD].
65. See, e.g., Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski, Protest and Participation in PostTransformation Poland: The Case of the Committee for the Defense of Democracy (KOD), 49
COMMUNIST AND POST-COMMUNIST STUDS. 255 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud
.2016.06.003 [https://perma.cc/GQ34-FFY5]; Krzysztof Podemski, Proces de-demokratyzacji
systemu politycznego a demokratyczne ruchy społeczne. Przypadek Polski 2015-2018
[Process of De-Democratization of the Political System and the Democratic Social
Movements: The Case of Poland 2015–2018], in EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR SOLIDARITY,
KONTRREWOLUCJA U BRAM [COUNTER-REVOLUTION AT THE GATES] 115–41 (Jacek Kołtan &
Grzegorz Piotrowski eds., 2020).
66. For a complete list of members of the Committee for the Defense of Justice (KOS)
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– Seeking new methods of approaching regular citizens to convince them that the
ruling party’s changes may affect their lives. Notably, Polish judges have
participated in musical rock festivals, using that exposure to promote different events
concerning the rule of law.67 Another interesting example is the activity of the Free
Courts Initiative (Inicjatywa “Wolne Sądy”), which started to use social media and
modern communication techniques to talk about abstract concepts such as judicial
independence or the division of powers in Poland.

One important issue concerning civic activism in Poland is the disconnect
between civic activism and the general population’s lack of legal awareness. NGOs
face the problem of trying to convey why judicial independence is important to
people’s daily lives, especially in times of economic prosperity. So, these NGOs
were acting like a sailor on a boat during a storm—it was difficult to navigate to
begin with, and they also had to concentrate on repairing sails, because their
condition was heavily neglected before the storm. In Poland, this neglect resulted
from an absence of comprehensive legal education programs available to the public.
Unlike judges elsewhere, Polish judges were not participating in public life in a
highly visible way—for example, they were not participating in educational media
programs like Justice Sonia Sotomayor did when she appeared on Sesame Street.68
Thus, Polish society lacks recognizable judicial figures like late U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Therefore, as a consequence of the nation’s
constitutional crisis, some lawyers also became human rights and citizenship
educators, sometimes using social media and other efficient communication
techniques. They had to get out of the box of their traditional role in society.
C. Solidarity of Lawyers
The dismantling of the rule of law cannot be accomplished without lawyers. The
Law and Justice party has managed to convince some Polish lawyers to be architects
of reforms, to serve as judges in the Constitutional Court, to serve as new presidents
of common courts, or to become members of the National Council of Judiciary. Some

and detailed accounts of the outcomes of their activities, see KOMITET OBRONY
SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI, [COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF JUSTICE],
https:/
/komitetobronysprawiedliwosci.pl/ [https://perma.cc/VWF4-GNAJ] (Pol.). Please note that
the KOS’s name refers to one of the first opposition groups in communist Poland: The
Committee to Protect Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR). For additional
information on the KOR, see Nina Witoszek, Friendship and Revolution in Poland: The Eros
and Ethos of the Committee for Workers’ Defense (KOR), 10 CRIT. REV. INT’L SOC. & POL.
PHIL., 215 (2007).
67. Some of the judges have even faced scrutiny from disciplinary judges for participating
in music festivals, speaking in panel debates, and wearing judicial gowns outside the
courtroom. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Poland: Free Courts, Free People. Judges
Standing for Their Independence (2019), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents
/EUR3704182019ENGLISH.PDF [https://perma.cc/7CXQ-BYJE].
68. Sesame Street, Sesame Street: Sonia Sotomayor: “The Justice Hears a Case.,”
YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FizspmIJbAw [https://perma
.cc/8CR9-77PF].
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of them probably made those commitments due to their genuine belief in the ruling
party’s changes. Others took advantage of the career opportunities that suddenly
appeared.69 Nevertheless, the ruling party’s changes have not been accepted by the
majority of lawyers. Moreover, these lawyers have started to cooperate with each
other. By hearkening back to old traditions of the Polish Solidarity movement, they
created solidarity among lawyers of different professions: judges, prosecutors,
attorneys, and legal advisors, with the support of members of academia. There were
different forms of such solidarity actions. The most exemplary form was a
demonstration organized by the Polish legal community to protect judicial
independence, which came to be known as the “March of One Thousand Gowns.”
On January 11, 2020, Polish judicial associations, accompanied by attorneys,
prosecutors, and legal advisors, organized this public demonstration, which was also
attended by judges from other countries who came to Warsaw to express solidarity.
This event had a significant impact on public discourse and was widely covered by
international media.70 Another form of solidarity is legal representation of judges
targeted and repressed by disciplinary judges or prosecutors. They are usually
represented pro bono by the best lawyers in a country.71
D. Birth of Constitutional Patriotism
To many Polish citizens, the Polish Constitution, which was ratified in 1997, has
been regarded as mere instructions as to how the state should operate, along with
some general principles. Due to historical reasons,72 Polish citizens tend to celebrate
the Constitution of May 3, 1791, more than the contemporary Constitution of April
2, 1997. However, protests concerning the Constitutional Court and judicial
independence have resulted in the birth of modern constitutional patriotism. Full
allegiance to constitutional values, principles, and rights became a trademark of those
who protest against undemocratic changes. The Constitution of 1997 has become a
symbol of resistance, but also of hope. It has united different movements and political
groups. There is a chance that the Constitution will become a binding force in
building the new, fully democratic Poland. Moreover, protest groups have started to
use a common symbol: an image reading “KonsTYtucJA,” where the words “TY”

69. See supra Section II.F.
70. See supra note 5.
71. There are also interesting family links. Jacek Dubois, a leading Polish criminal
attorney, is representing “dissident” judges, most notably Igor Tuleya; his father, Maciej
Dubois, represented political dissidents in Communist times.
72. The Constitution of May 3, 1791, was the second constitution in the world, adopted
just before the partitioning of Poland by three empires (Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary).
The Constitution of May 3 put Poland on the track to modernization, but it was too late to save
Poland from losing its independence. Therefore, the Constitution of May 3 is widely celebrated
as a symbol of wisdom and civic courage, although it has almost nothing in common with the
contemporary constitutional system. For an English translation of the May 3 Constitution, see
the version published by Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Main Archive of Historical Acts)
and translated by Franciszek Bukaty, with a foreword by Anna Grześkowiak-Krwawicz
explaining
the
document’s
historical
context,
http://agad.gov.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/Konstytucja-3-maja_Eng-v4.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY44-X8AK].
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and “JA” mean “You” and “I.”73 This poster, created by Luka Rayski, has become
the most recognizable emblem of many pro-democratic demonstrations in Poland.74
E. The Ombudsman’s Office
The Ombudsman’s Office was created in Poland in 1987, two years before the
country’s democratic transformation began.75 Later on, the office became a bridge
between old times and new times, helping the newly democratic state administration
to learn basics of constitutional protection of rights and freedoms. The Office of the
Ombudsman was written into the Constitution (Articles 208–212) and gained
important powers concerning protection of rights and freedoms. It has also gained
public trust. This constitutional and institutional strength of the Ombudsman was
important to resist the undemocratic tide that has been rising in Poland since 2015,
in terms of providing alternative arguments to those proposed by the Law and Justice
party-led government, but also in using strategic litigation to counteract some
legislative changes (e.g. participation in proceedings before CJEU and ECtHR as
third party interveners). In addition, the opinions issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman were important to a number of international organizations and bodies.76
F. Judges
Polish judges have been subjected to a tremendous amount of pressure from the
Law and Justice party since 2015. They have been targeted as an “extraordinary
caste” or as “elites” that are far removed from society and its problems. Politicians
in Poland have used individual cases of judicial mistakes or violations of judicial
ethics as examples of misbehavior, poor moral character, and the need to reform the
judiciary, especially with respect to disciplinary cases. Some individual judges were
the targets of disciplinary cases or hate speech.77 Hate campaigns have been
coordinated by the former Deputy Minister of Justice.78 Despite this pressure, judges
have shown significant personal courage and professional dignity. They have

73. Susan Yelavich, A Sign of Resistance; A Symbol of Hope, DESIGNOBSERVER (Nov. 8,
2017),
https://designobserver.com/feature/a-sign-of-resistance-a-symbol-of-hope/39638
[https://perma.cc/SH5D-EZL8].
74. Id.
75. See Ewa Łętowska, The Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights in Central and Eastern
Europe: The Polish Experience, ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 1 (1996).
76. In 2019, the Polish Ombudsman Office was awarded the Rule of Law Award by the
World Justice Project for its defense of rule of law standards in Poland. World Justice Project
Announces 2019 Rule of Law Award Honoree, WORLD JUST. PROJECT (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://worldjusticeproject.org/news/world-justice-project-announces-2019-rule-law-awardhonoree [https://perma.cc/5RL9-9PGW].
77. Anne Applebaum, The Disturbing Campaign Against Poland’s Judges, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/disturbingcampaign-against-polish-judges/605623/ [https://perma.cc/6YFD-HK9R].
78. Christian Davies, Top Polish Official Resigns Over Alleged Harassment of Judges,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2019, 12:55 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/21
/top-polish-official-resigns-over-alleged-harassment-of-judges
[https://perma.cc/SYE3XHJD].
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managed to create bonds of unity within judicial associations, to organize protests,
to have contact with regular citizens, and to propose alternative legislative solutions
to those proposed by the Law and Justice party. This courage should be appreciated
due to the personal risk judges face in carrying out these actions, including the
suspension of their judicial mandate. Three of them—Paweł Juszczyszyn, Beata
Morawiec, and Igor Tuleya—were suspended in 2020 after decisions of the
Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court.79 Although Beata Morawiec was
recently reinstated and other judges have good chances of winning their cases before
the European Court of Human Rights,80 their example might deter other Polish judges
from maintaining their independence when performing judicial duties.
G. European Union Membership
Poland’s membership in the European Union proved to be a crucial factor in
saving some remnants of judicial independence. Between 2016 and 2020, Poland
was subjected to numerous international monitoring procedures by the UN Human
Rights Committee, the UN Universal Periodic Review, the UN Special Rapporteur
on Judicial Independence, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of
Europe, GRECO, the Venice Commission, and the Monitoring Committee of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. However, a great majority of the
recommendations of these institutions concerning the rule of law were simply
ignored by the Polish authorities. Nevertheless, those recommendations certainly
helped to legitimize the different interventions and actions undertaken in Poland by
the EU.
The EU legal system and its relationship to legal systems of EU Member States
might be categorized as a system of multi-level governance, or it could be compared
to federal systems.81 One of the key principles of the EU legal order is the obligation
to respect so-called “European values,” which are democracy, human rights, the rule
of law, as well as protection of minorities. Moreover, the European legal order is
based on the principle of mutual trust between EU Member States and their judicial
systems. Without such trust, neither the smooth operation of the Common Market
nor cooperation in criminal matters would be possible.

79. Beata Morawiec was reinstated in June 2021. However, there are other cases pending
before the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court that may lead to suspensions.
80. The European Court of Human Rights has already communicated Judge Tuleya’s case
to the Polish government. Tuleya v. Poland, App. No. 21181/19 (Sept. 1, 2020), http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-204784 [https://perma.cc/TUS3-AVFQ]. Judges Juszczyszyn and
Morawiec have also submitted their cases to the ECHR. A similar case from Iceland provides
helpful guidance as to how Tuleya and Juszczyszyn’s cases might be resolved, as it provides
a comprehensive test to examine the impact of executive power on the judiciary. Ástráðsson
v. Iceland, App. No. 26374/18 (Dec. 1, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001 -206582
[https://perma.cc/495V-CE8S].
81. There is plenty of literature on the character of the EU legal system and its
comparability to federal systems, see, e.g., THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF
GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert
Howse eds., 2001); THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (Gráinne de Búrca & J.
H. H. Weiler eds., 2012).
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For a number of years, the EU was not supervising the judicial systems of EU
Member States, as these systems were viewed as predominantly internal issues of
Member States. However, starting with the case Associação Sindical dos Juizes
Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas (ASJP),82 the EU Court of Justice declared that it
has the power to verify whether a member state’s potential violation of judicial
independence requires EU intervention to ensure effective judicial protection to EU
citizens.
ASJP paved the way for the Court of Justice to examine cases concerning judicial
independence in Poland. Although there were many more cases (and some of them
are still pending), it is interesting to look at two examples. First, thanks to an interim
measure made by the CJEU on October 19, 2018,83 more than twenty judges of the
Polish Supreme Court were allowed to return to adjudicating cases; they had been
forced into early retirement as a result of the Law and Justice party’s legislative
provision decreasing their retirement age from seventy to sixty-five. This legislative
change affected even the First President of the Supreme Court, who had a guaranteed
six-year constitutional term. Due to the EU’s intervention, Małgorzata Gersdorf was
able to complete her term, which ended in April 2020.
Second, it is important to mention the EU Court of Justice’s judgment of
November 19, 2019, in which the Court created a test setting out how individual
judges should evaluate the independence of the NCJ and the Disciplinary Chamber
of the Supreme Court. This judgment was met with strong resistance from the Law
and Justice party, which managed to successfully push for adoption of a “muzzle
law.” This law goes in a completely different direction than the EU law would
require. But we should also note that as a result of implementation of the Court of
Justice’s 2019 judgment, three joined chambers of the Polish Supreme Court adopted
a resolution, which allows for exclusion of judges who were unlawfully elected by
the newly composed NCJ.84
The above cases may suggest that Poland has become the laboratory for the EU
to test the use of different rule of law measures. There is a chance that these Polish
cases will be in future history books presented in a way similar to America’s
Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation Doctrine caselaw starting with Gitlow v.
New York.85 The principle of effective protection, as guaranteed by Article 19 of the
Treaty on European Union, coupled with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
may lead the EU’s restriction of member states’ power to regulate their own
judiciaries.
But the principle of effective protection might also be the start of a legal war
between Poland and the EU. The Polish government’s consistent undermining of the
EU law by Polish authorities, lack of respect for the EU hierarchy, and attempts to
escape EU legal pressure may lead to a “legal Polexit,” similar to “Brexit,” whereby

82. Case C‑64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, ¶¶ 32–44 (Feb. 27, 2018).
83. Order of the Vice-President of the EU Court of Justice in Case C-619/18, supra note
28.
84. The resolution of three joined chambers of the Supreme Court was adopted on January
23, 2020 (No. BSA I-4110-1/20). It was one of the most remarkable examples of defending
judicial independence by judges in the Polish history.
85. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

1084

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:1059

Poland would sever itself from the legal obligations that come with EU membership.
Furthermore, there were three cases pending before the Polish Constitutional Court
submitted by the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court,86 the Prime Minister,87
and the ruling party88 that aim to undermine the principle of supremacy of EU Law.89
There is a risk that the politically dependent Constitutional Court will be used in
order to boost the “constitutional identity” argument and thus to refuse to obey the
EU law and judgments of the CJEU. The first step in this direction has been made.
On 14 July 2021 the Constitutional Court adjudicating in five-judges panel has
declared that the EU law should not bound Polish authorities when it comes to the
organization of the Polish judiciary and thus the EU law does not have supremacy
over the Polish Constitution.90 This judgment provoked a lot of controversy and
criticism.91 Two other cases await a final resolution.
The EU principle of mutual trust will not be applicable to Poland if its courts lose
their independence. There are already significant problems concerning the use of the
European Arrest Warrant to surrender suspects to Poland.92 Breaking the legal trust
connecting judicial systems in the EU could be a first step toward problems in
numerous cases of a transborder nature.
Recent agreement on the future EU budget for the years 2021–2027 is an
important step in safeguarding the rule of law in the EU. For the first time, the EU is
using the policy of conditionality for the expenditures given to member states from
the EU budget. Thus, the EU will be able to block the transfer of budget money if a
given EU Member State does not comply with the EU rule of law requirements.
There is a chance that this new legal instrument,93 coupled with the growing caselaw

86. Case No. P 7/20.
87. Case No. K 3/21.
88. Case No. K 5/21.
89. Maria Wilczek, Will Poland Break from the EU?, THE TIMES (June 10, 2021),
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/will-poland-break-from-the-eu-zsf0dn3qt [https://perma
.cc/2ZLB-R73W].
90. Judgment of the Constitutional Court of July 15, 2021, P 7/20, https://trybunal.gov
.pl/en/hearings/judgments/art/11589-obowiazek-panstwa-czlonkowskiego-ue-polegajacy-nawykonywaniu-srodkow-tymczasowych-odnoszacych-sie-do-ksztaltu-ustroju-ifunkcjonowania-konstytucyjnych-organow-wladzy-sadowniczej-tego-panstwa [https://perma
.cc/L6A2-DRHE]; Rule of Law Dispute Deepens as Rulings by Polish and EU Courts Clash,
REUTERS (July 14, 2021, 2:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/polish-court-ruleseu-interim-measures-are-against-constitution-2021-07-14/ [https://perma.cc/2KLN-84J5].
91. Steven Erlanger & Monika Pronczuk, Poland Escalates Fight With Europe Over the
Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/15/world/europe
/poland-hungary-europe.html [https://perma.cc/LK26-Y3PZ].
92. Joined Cases C-354/20 PPU & C-412/20 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie,
ECLI:EU:C:2020:1033, ¶ 69 (Dec. 17, 2020). This judgment does not automatically stop the
surrender of suspects to Poland. Nevertheless, the existence of tests, which must be checked
by national courts, delays the operation of this useful legal institution. There is also a risk that
in certain individual cases, including those of a political nature, courts in other EU Member
States may refuse to make a surrender to Poland on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant.
See id.
93. Regulation on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies
as regards the rule of law in Member States, legislative initiative resolution adopted by the
European Parliament on 16 December 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document
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of the CJEU and the annual report on the rule of law,94 will contribute to the
strengthening of EU rule of law standards.
H. Pluralism of Debate
As compared to Hungary,95 Poland still seems to have pluralistic debate on a
number of issues. Although the space for this debate is shrinking (due to pressure on
civil society and the strong role of state-controlled public media), civil society
organizations, opposing political parties, public intellectuals, and selected media
outlets provide room for discussion.96 In fact, there have been instances when the
ruling party resigned from some ideas, afraid of public outrage.
But this pluralism is also alive today thanks to the domination of opposition
parties in big cities. The mayors of most of Poland’s large cities are affiliated with
opposition parties. The parliamentary elections of 2019 were won by the Law and
Justice party, but only in the lower chamber of the Parliament (Sejm). It allowed the
ruling party to remain in power and to form the majority government. However, the
opposition won elections to the upper chamber of the Parliament (Senate). Under the
Polish Constitution, the Senate cannot effectively block any laws proposed by the
Law and Justice party. However, it has thirty days for review of any legislative act
adopted by Sejm. This time gives a chance for reflection, for more balanced and
pluralistic consideration of different arguments. As a result, the character of the
legislative process has changed, as compared to situation before recent parliamentary
elections. Different Senate discussions had a significant impact on the public debate.
Interestingly, the opposition-led Senate blocked three times the appointment of the
new Ombudsman proposed by the ruling party, because this decision required the
consent of two chambers of Parliament. Finally, the pressure by the Senate resulted
in the appointment of a person, with a full constitutional authority and trust of two
chambers of the Parliament, in accordance with Article 209 Section 1 of the Polish
Constitution. In July 2021, Marcin Wiącek was appointed the new Ombudsman.

/TA-9-2020-0356_EN.html#title1 [https://perma.cc/7UJR-ZG8A].
94. European Commission, 2020 Rule of Law Report, supra n. 29.
95. See generally ELDA BROGI, IVA NENADIC, MARIO VIOLA DE AZEVEDO CUNHA, & PIERR
LUIGI PARCU, CTR. FOR MEDIA PLURALISM & MEDIA FREEDOM, ASSESSING CERTAIN RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HUNGARIAN MEDIA MARKET THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE MEDIA
PLURALISM MONITOR, (2019), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/64284/Hungarian
_media_market.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/A2M6-K8LR].
96. On the situation in private media, see ANNABELLE CHAPMAN, PLURALISM UNDER
ATTACK: THE ASSAULT ON PRESS FREEDOM IN POLAND (2017), https://freedomhouse.org/sites
/default/files/2020-02/FH_Poland_Media_Report_Final_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FZGFQKZ]. Please note, however, that in 2020 the major state-controlled oil giant PKN Orlen
purchased Polska Press, a company owning twenty local press titles. It seems that the Law and
Justice party will try to increase its control over media by using state-owned companies to
acquire independent media companies. See Alicja Ptak & Anna Koper, Poland Uses StateOwned Refiner to Buy Regional Media Firm, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-polskapress-m-a-pknorlen/poland-uses-state-owned-refiner-to-buy-regionalmedia-firm-idUSKBN28H277 [https://perma.cc/X5DE-ENBC].
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IV. FUTURE OF POLAND
The current situation regarding the Polish judiciary is dire, as it undermines the
stability of the country’s legal system, especially when it comes to cooperation with
courts of the other EU member states. The judicial reforms have also had significant
internal consequences. They may lead to lack of accountability for state authorities,
discriminatory use of legal procedures against political opponents of the Law and
Justice (so-called discriminatory legalism97), and a steady decline in the rule of law
standards, following a trajectory similar to that which Hungary has followed under
Viktor Orbán’s rule.
Depending on a number of circumstances (reaction from the EU, resistance from
Polish society, results of political elections) two likely outcomes emerge for Poland
in the future.
In the negative scenario, Poland may experience the steady creation of an
authoritarian system or a regular system of competitive authoritarianism.98 Although
these systems would provide for the operation of different institutions, this is a
façade, as those institutions cannot change the way the authoritarian system operates.
Opponents cannot effectively compete with those in power. Discriminatory legalism,
in the form of court actions and inspections, would be used extensively against those
who question the legitimacy of the ruling party. Judges would be forced to
understand and respect the lines they cannot cross when adjudicating cases,
especially when they deal with cases of a political nature. Such a scenario may lead
to the questioning of Polish membership in the EU, as the EU is based on principles
of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Finally, such a scenario may affect
transatlantic relations, as well as the geopolitical position of Poland as a bridge
between the East and the West.
But there is also a positive scenario. It may happen that Poland will get back on
the democratic track. However, this democracy would certainly look different than
the one that existed before the Law and Justice party’s rise to power. Poland would
have to rebuild the justice system and undo the reforms implemented by the Law and
Justice party. It may take even a generation to do it. Poland’s new democratic
authorities would have to assure citizens about the return to continuity as regards the
future development of Poland in order to secure stability and to deepen compliance
with the rule of law. In this positive scenario, Poland would have to strengthen both
the sense of integration into the EU, and also be a good partner in transatlantic
relations. The democratization of Poland has been one of America and Western
Europe’s most pivotal achievements of the post-Cold War era. There remains a hope
for this rebirth of such a positive influence on the world. Maybe the Polish case will
serve one day as a warning for other countries heading down a similar path.
Neither Polish democrats nor civil society can predict the future. But, in the face
of this unpredictability, they may provide the only answer for the future of Poland:
there is a need to work hard in order to resist the Law and Justice party’s changes; to

97. See Kurt Weyland, Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift: The Threat from the Populist
Left, 24 J. DEMOCRACY 18 (2013), https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads
/2013/07/Weyland-24-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM8N-Y47L].
98. See Levitsky & Way, supra note 64; see also Bodnar, supra note 64, at 119–48
(applying the theory of Levitsky and Way to the situation in Poland).
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defend the principles of liberal democracy; and to use new methods of
communication, transnational networks, and creativity. Certainly, this is not the time
to be silent and be complacent in the face of the political trajectory of changes.
Karol Modzelewski, a Polish hero who spent eight years in Polish prisons during
Communist era,99 said that every generation has a certain price to be paid. In a private
conversation in 2016, he said to me: “Now you are the battle soldier.” I feel
privileged that I am one of many devoted battle soldiers, together with Polish judges,
members of academia, activists, and citizens on the streets. I am honored that we can
enjoy support of allied forces of democracy-believers in the United States, who show
us solidarity and trust.

99. Joanna Berendt, Karol Modzelewski, Inspiring Vice of Poland’s Solidarity, is Dead at
51, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/obituaries/karolmodzelewski-dead.html [https://perma.cc/Q32M-LHQF].

